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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, global agri-food systems have undergone a rapid transformation towards higher 
concentration, closer vertical coordination, and more stringent food quality and safety standards 
(Swinnen and Maertens 2007, Maertens and Swinnen 2009, Reardon et al. 2009). In many developing 
countries, dualistic domestic markets have evolved with traditional wet markets still handling a large 
proportion of fresh fruits and vegetables on the one hand, and modern retail chains offering processed 
but increasingly also fresh produce that is subject to strict quality and food safety regulations on the 
other hand (Reardon et al. 2003). Similarly, exports from developing countries to the EU or US 
markets need to comply with increasingly complex food safety regulations (Dolan and Humphrey 
2000, Henson et al 2005). This offers both opportunities as well as threats to smallholder farmers in 
developing countries. Many authors emphasize that participation in these emerging high-value markets 
can support farmers in upgrading their production systems, and in improving their incomes and overall 
well-being. On the other hand, stringent requirements that have to be met in order to comply with 
standards have been perceived as a barrier to participation in high-value markets potentially 
marginalizing smaller and resource-poor farmers (Reardon et al 2009).  
In the past, the definition and implementation of food safety standards was mostly in the domain of 
public institutions and regulators. Over recent years, there has been a shift towards private standards 
that define minimum requirements for produce to enter a specific supply chain (Dolan and Humphrey 
2000, Maertens and Swinnen 2009). Some of these standards have become quasi-mandatory, such as 
GlobalGAP, which has been adopted by a large number of retail chains in major EU markets. With a 
shift in the standard setting authority from public to private, the question arises who will assume 
responsibility for facilitating farm-level adjustments to the new standard requirements. Public 
extension services in developing countries often lack the capacities and specialized knowledge to 
prepare farmers for upgrading and compliance with private standards. This can partly be attributed to 
the dualistic market structure with low food safety and quality requirements in traditional markets and 
high requirements in modern domestic and export markets resulting in a food safety and quality gap at 
the producer level. Public extension services have so far mostly served traditional markets and are 
usually not equipped to support farmers in overcoming the food safety and quality gap between 
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traditional and modern markets. As a response to this, there has been a surge in contract schemes and 
new institutional arrangements including public-private partnerships that have evolved to provide the 
necessary support structure to farmers in order to narrow this gap (Kersting and Wollni 2012).  
Contract schemes vary from rather informal, trust-based agreements to written contracts that can be 
legally enforced. Also, the intensity of the vertical coordination varies from case to case. Simple 
marketing agreements only specify the quantity and time of delivery as well as a fixed or variable 
pricing scheme. Production contracts involve much closer vertical interaction where buyers may 
provide inputs or perform specific on-farm tasks during the production cycle. Previous studies have 
argued that contractual arrangements can help small-scale farmers to participate in and benefit from 
high-value markets with high standard requirements. Through contract schemes, farmers can benefit 
from a safe market outlet thus reducing their risk associated with relationship-specific investments. In 
addition, especially production contracts are often designed to overcome missing markets providing 
farmers with access to inputs, credit and extension. In this context, contract schemes provide a 
safeguard to buyers, when providing these services to farmers.  
In this paper we investigate the role of formal and informal private-sector contract schemes for farm-
level upgrading and performance in high-value chains. In a first step, we analyze the determinants of 
participation in formal and informal contract schemes. In a second step, we look at the effects of 
contract schemes on standard adoption. Finally, we investigate whether farmers engaged in contract 
schemes face better marketing conditions and reduced risk in the supply chain and whether this is 
reflected in increased net revenues derived from pineapple production. We address these questions in 
the context of a case study carried out with export-oriented small and medium-scale pineapple farmers 
in Costa Rica. The Costa Rican pineapple sector represents a typical agricultural high-value chain 
dominated by vertically integrated international agribusinesses with a strong export orientation, which 
is increasingly regulated by private standards that set product and process requirements. The paper is 
structured as follows. In the next chapter we provide some background on the Costa Rican pineapple 
sector and describe the food standards that are of relevance for the export market. In chapter three we 
introduce the data and methodology used in the study. Chapter four presents and discusses results and 
chapter five concludes. 
COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE COSTA RICAN PINEAPPLE SECTOR 
Since the introduction of pineapple as an export crop in Costa Rica, the sector has expanded rapidly 
(Vagneron et al. 2009), and nowadays Costa Rica is the largest exporter of fresh pineapple in the 
world. Between 2000 and 2009, pineapple production more than doubled increasing from 0.9 million 
tons to 1.9 million tons. A major part of the production is destined for the export market, which 
amounted to 1.5 million tons of pineapples in 2008 (FAO Stat 2011). The main destination markets of 
Costa Rican pineapple exports are Europe (approx. 52%) and the U.S. (approx. 48%) (CANAPEP 
2011). Due to trade agreements, exporters do not incur entry tariffs to access these markets. Both 
European and U.S. markets, however, are demanding in terms of sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards 
and public food safety regulations. Furthermore, the importance of private food safety and quality 
standards has been increasing in these markets over recent years.  
The Costa Rican pineapple sector consists of approximately 170 exporters, 72 packing facilities and 
1300 producers (CANAPEP 2011). Many exporters are vertically integrated into the processing and 
production stages, thus disposing of their own packing plants and production units. The majority of the 
production destined to export markets originates from such vertically integrated production units that 
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are owned by international and national private firms. Only 5 to 10% of the total export volume is 
produced by small and medium-scale farmers (MAG 2007; Vagneron 2009). The vast majority of 
these smallholders, approximately 98%, are located in the Huetar Norte region, where around 50% of 
the pineapple destined for export markets is grown (MAG 2007, CANAPEP 2011). The other two 
pineapple growing regions, namely the Atlantic (33% of export production) and the Pacific (17% of 
export production) regions (CANAPEP 2011), are dominated by large-scale integrated production 
units. Small-scale farmers deliver their produce either to cooperatives or directly to exporters, who 
impose strict standards in terms of volumes, product safety and quality (Vagneron et al. 2009). 
The most important food safety and quality standard in the Costa Rican pineapple sector is the 
GlobalGAP standard, a private collective standard developed by the European Retailer Association. 
The GlobalGAP standard represents a set of rules defining good agricultural practices, especially 
related to pesticide use and handling of waste. While being a voluntary standard, GlobalGAP is 
becoming quasi-mandatory in some countries, e.g. the UK and Scandinavia, because major retailers 
demand it as a prerequisite (Poissot 2003). The main purpose of the GlobalGAP standard is the 
harmonization and codification of information along the supply chain, i.e. it is used as a coordination 
mechanism and not as a marketing tool. Therefore it is not associated with a price premium at the 
consumer level.  Still in some cases buyers may pay higher prices for GlobalGAP certified products at 
the producer level to provide incentives to farmers to comply with GlobalGAP regulations (Kersting 
and Wollni 2012).  
Besides food safety and quality standards, sustainability standards have gained in importance during 
recent years. In the Costa Rican pineapple sector, organic certification and the Rainforest Alliance 
standard are of particular relevance. The Rainforest Alliance standard, which was developed by the 
Sustainable Agriculture Network – a coalition of various environmental NGOs, is a voluntary process 
standard focusing on sustainable production systems. Certification with this standard entitles farmers 
to use the Rainforest Alliance label on their products as a marketing tool to inform consumers about 
the sustainability of their product. Currently markets are still limited and there is no secure price 
premium, however, farmers might benefit in terms of securing access to a potentially growing market 
(Giovannucci and Ponte 2005).  
Similarly, the organic standard is a voluntary process standard that can be used as a signal to producers 
who are willing to pay a price premium for organically produced products. The International 
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) has developed basic guidelines that serve as 
a reference for national and private agencies to develop more specific organic standards. During the 
past decade, the organic market segment has experienced considerable growth rates in US and EU 
markets. In response to this, many countries have implemented public standards to regulate the organic 
sector (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005). Certification with organic standards can be associated with high 
implementation costs, especially due to long transition periods from conventional to organic 
production systems. This exposes farmers to major uncertainties regarding future prices of organic 
produce, given that the price premium is not fixed but depends on market conditions.   
To close the gap between the quality and food safety of produce delivered by small and medium scale 
pineapple growers and the quality and safety requirements of international markets, several exporters 
have engaged in contracts with growers. The terms of these contracts differ substantially and vary 
from verbal to written agreements and from marketing to production contracts.  
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DATA AND METHODS 
The analysis is based on original survey data that was collected in two major pineapple production 
areas in the Huetar Norte region in northern Costa Rica, namely in Pital and Guatuso. Pineapple 
production has been around in Pital for a long time, whereas it expanded to Guatuso relatively 
recently. The survey was implemented from November 2010 to January 2011 and included a random 
sample of 173 households involved in pineapple cultivation. A standardized questionnaire was used to 
collect data on pineapple production, standard adoption and marketing as well as on socio-economic 
household variables. 
We estimate a bivariate probit model to identify the determinants of participation in verbal and written 
contracts among pineapple growers in our research area. Furthermore, we apply duration analysis to 
estimate the effect of vertical coordination on standard adoption. Descriptive statistics including one-
way analyses of variance and post-hoc tests are used to compare the marketing conditions of farmers 
involved in different types of vertical coordination. Finally, we estimate a regression model to analyze 
the effect of vertical coordination on the net revenue from pineapple production.  
RESULTS  
In our data set, 32% of the farmers have a verbal agreement and 41% have a written contract with their 
main buyer. The remaining 27% of the farmers have no agreement prior to selling their fruit.  
Participation in formal and informal contracts 
Results of the bivariate probit model on contract participation indicates that farmers are more likely to 
participate in formal contract schemes if they are more educated, if they are member of a pineapple 
producer organization and if they are member of social organizations (reflecting their willingness to 
engage in social and group activities). On the other hand, farmers are less likely to participate in 
formal contract schemes if they have off-farm activities. Farmers, who have access to off-farm 
income, may not need the support offered by formal contract schemes as they can access credit and 
information from other sources.  Furthermore, the model shows that the more experienced farmers are, 
the less likely they are to engage in a formal contract. This indicates that farmers with long-term 
experience in the sector do not depend on the support offered by formal contract schemes. On the 
other hand, all other factors held constant, the longer the farmer has know the buyer, the more likely 
they are to engage in a formal contract.  
The bivariate model results further show that participation in verbal contracts is more likely among 
less educated, younger households with a larger number of male adult household members. All other 
factors held constant, experience in the pineapple sector has a positive effect on the engagement in a 
verbal contract providing some evidence that farmers may move from formal to informal contracts 
after gaining some experience in the sector. Land size is not significant in either of the equations 
indicating that within our sample of small and medium-sized producers we do not find evidence for 
the exclusion of smaller farmers from formal or informal contract schemes due to their land size. 
Relationship between vertical coordination and standard adoption 
Next, we address the question whether participation in contract schemes leads to upgrading of the 
production process. Table 1 shows the relationship between vertical coordination and standard 
adoption. 
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Table 1: Vertical coordination and standard adoption 
 GlobalGAP Sustainability* No standard 
Signed contract 82% 34% 14% 
Verbal agreement 38% 9% 61% 
No agreement 9% 4% 89% 
Rows do not sum up to 100% because some farmers have both GlobalGAP and sustainability standards. 
* Sustainability standard are here Rainforest Alliance and/or Organic standard 
 
Table 1 shows that of those farmers, who have a signed contract, 82% have adopted GlobalGAP and 
34% have adopted a sustainability standard. Contrary to this, 61% of farmers holding a verbal 
agreement and 89% of farmers holding no agreement have not adopted any standard to upgrade their 
production process. This simple comparison provides some evidence that a formal contract is a major 
catalyst for upgrading. Certainly, from this simple comparison one cannot derive whether contracts 
facilitated standard adoption or whether certified farmers have better access to formal contracts. We 
investigate this further by applying a duration model to look at the factors influencing standard 
adoption. 
Results of the duration analysis show that participation in both formal and informal contracts has a 
significant and positive effect on the adoption of standards. Farmers with contracts are significantly 
more likely to be early adopters, even if we exclude contracts that were formed just one year before 
adoption. In addition, we find that larger farmers are more likely to be early adopters of standards. The 
results confirm that contract schemes can act as an important catalyst for farm-level upgrading. 
Benefits of participation in contract schemes 
While the adoption of a standard can be perceived as a benefit derived from contract participation, the 
standard itself is only a means to improve market access and revenues of farmers. In the following we 
compare the marketing conditions of farmers involved in different types of vertical coordination. The 
comparison provides some evidence on the extent to which contracts help to overcome missing 
markets and reduce the uncertainties in the supply chain. 
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Table 2: Relationship characteristics of different forms of vertical coordination 
 
No agreement 
Verbal 
agreement 
Signed 
contract 
 
 (Mean) (Mean) (Mean)  
Buyer provides inputs 0 3.6% 1.4%  
Buyer provides credit 9% 21% 55% *** 
Buyer provides extension 9% 50% 90% *** 
Pineapple rejections (in %) 4.5% 6.7% 11.2% ** 
Informed about reason 75% 91% 95% ** 
Agreed with reason 57% 73% 62%  
Percentage graded as high quality 
(grade 5-7) 
59% 64% 66% 
 
Average price received for high-
quality fruit (in US$) 
0.31 0.30 0.30 
 
Days to payment according to 
agreement 
16 18 26 
*** 
Days to payment in reality 30 31 53 *** 
Net revenue from pineapple 7,947 18,085 18,125  
***[**] significant at 1% [5%] probability of error 
Descriptive statistics show that while contract farmers on the average have significantly better access 
to credit and extension through their buyers, they do not benefit in terms of higher quality grades or 
higher prices. While one would expect that closer vertical coordination lead to the more efficient 
transmission of relevant information regarding product requirements along the value chain and thereby 
reduce rejection rates, we find that rejection rates are higher in formal contract schemes. In 
comparison to farmers without agreement, farmers with verbal or written contract at least seem to be 
better informed about the reasons for rejection. Finally, contract farmers have to wait significantly 
longer for their payments. In addition to longer payment periods, farmers with written contracts also 
suffered from the longest payment delays. The results indicate that major risks such as high rejection 
rates and long payment delays are not solved, but rather aggravated in formal contract schemes.  
Finally, we look at the level of trust and loyalty in vertical relationships. Farmers were asked to rate 
different statements regarding trust and loyalty with their main buyer on a 5-point Likert scale. Based 
on these statements three constructs were identified using principal component analysis (see appendix 
for a description of the constructs). Mean values of each construct for the different types of vertical 
coordination are presented in Table 3. Results show that farmers engaged in a signed contract display 
low levels of trust based on past experience, which can be attributed to the long payment delays and 
high rejection rates. Their low trust levels are comparable to the level of trust among farmers that do 
not have any agreement. On the other hand, verbal agreements are based on a trustful relationship 
between farmer and buyer. The loyalty expressed by farmers is highest in the case of signed contracts, 
which is due to the legally binding character of the written agreement preventing farmers from 
switching buyers in the short run. Loyalty is lowest in the case of no agreement, where farmers 
normally choose the buyer offering the best prices at the time of harvest. Finally, those farmers who 
have a verbal agreement have the highest confidence in the future relationship with their buyer. 
Although they would switch their buyer if their expectations are not fulfilled, they have built trust 
based on positive experiences in the past which makes them confident in the future of their marketing 
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relationship. On the other hand, farmers without agreement do not rely on a stable marketing 
relationship and therefore display the lowest level of confidence in their future relationship to a 
particular buyer.  
Table 3: Trust and loyalty in vertical relationships 
 
No agreement 
Verbal 
agreement 
Signed 
contract 
 
Trust based on past experience -0.13 0.31 -0.17 * 
Loyalty -0.33 0.04 0.15 * 
Lack of confidence in future relationship 0.31 -0.17 -0.04 * 
* significant at 10% probability of error 
 
Finally, we estimate the effects of participation in formal and informal contract arrangements on the 
net revenue from pineapple production. Regression results show that the net revenue derived from 
pineapple production increases with the length of both formal and informal agreements. Net revenue 
increases by 1,370 US$/year with an additional year of a formal contract and by 2,218 US$/year with 
an additional year of a verbal contract, ceteris paribus. In addition, we are controlling for factors such 
as farm size, pineapple price, the percentage of pineapple graded as high quality and the percentage of 
fruit rejected, which are significant and have the expected signs. 
CONCLUSIONS  
The study addresses the concern that with a shift from public to private standard setting, public 
support structures in developing countries will not be sufficient to facilitate farmers` adaptation to the 
requirements set by private standards. Previous studies have documented the emergence of private 
contract schemes that aim at filling this gap supporting farm-level adaptation (e.g. Le Coq et al 2010). 
Most studies focusing on a particular outgrower scheme have been optimistic about the ability of these 
private-sector initiatives to support small-scale farmers in their upgrading process. In this study, taking 
into account verbal and written contracts between pineapple producers and several downstream 
buyers, we find that contracts can act as an important catalyst for standard implementation and that 
contract farmers derive higher net revenues from pineapple production. Yet, we believe that some 
caution is warranted given that major uncertainties faced by farmers in the supply chain are not 
resolved. In order to build sustainable value chains that are beneficial to both farmers and buyers in the 
long-term, communication and information flows along the supply chain need to be improved. In 
particular, long payment delays and high rejection rates reduce farmers’ trust in the marketing 
relationship. Anecdotal evidence from the Costa Rican pineapple sector reveals that disadoption rates 
of standards are high among small and medium-scale producers due to the fact that farmers do not 
perceive a strong benefit in terms of market access (high rejection rates) or monetary compensation 
(no price premiums, long payment delays). Further research is needed that looks into the long-term 
sustainability of private-sector contract schemes and standard adoption.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Construct Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Item Load 
Trust based on past 
experiences 
0.856 I think that my buyer has been trustful during the 
time I have dealt with him 
I will not say negative comments about my buyer to 
my friends and family 
I would recommend my buyer to my friends and 
family who also harvest pineapple 
In general, I think that my buyer has been honest 
with me 
0.833 
 
0.818 
 
0.811 
 
0.737 
Loyalty 0.606 If my buyer would lower the price he pays for the 
product, I would still work with him 
I would not switch to another buyer even if he 
offers me a better price for my product 
As long as I live here and harvest pineapple, I do 
not feel the need to look for another buyer 
0.763 
 
0.743 
 
0.663 
Lack of confidence in 
future relationships 
0.490 I think I have to be careful, when I deal with my 
buyer 
I think that I CANNOT trust that my buyer will 
fulfill his promises 
0.870 
 
0.694 
 
